Gulf of Tonkin Incident |
Although many U.S. sources would argue that North Vietnamese attacks on American naval vessels were unprovoked,
America’s evident self-victimization was more likely a mass deception executed by a violence-oriented government.
Regarding the allegedly random attacks on the U.S.S. Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy, the United States government reported
that these actions were in no way provoked by any aggression on their part. However, the evidence alternatively suggests that unwarranted American activity may have prompted the North Vietnamese to retaliate. In a conversation between President Johnson and former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson, the President himself could be recorded as saying, “There have been some covert operations in that area that we have been carrying on— blowing up some bridges and things of that kind, roads and so forth. So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it.” (Document 3). It can be discerned that to combat widespread dissent with activities in Vietnam, what the government really intended and what it claimed to intend may have been two completely different things. To introduce “The Real Story,” it is stated that “Publicly, administration officials were unwilling to admit that the U.S. Navy destroyers may have been engaged in provocative military action against North Vietnam. But privately they knew better.” This goes to show that while trying to look favorable in the public eye, the government may have distributed misinformation about the recent occurrences in the Gulf of Tonkin. Through further analyzing the text, a particular exchange that stands out is that of Johnson and Anderson discussing their course of action in the Gulf. As stated the President, “What happened was we’ve been playing around up there and they came out, gave us a warning, and we knocked hell out of ‘em.” Anderson then replied, “That’s the best thing in the world you could have done— just knock hell out of ‘em.” (Document 3). This violent language indicates violent intentions, which may have led to the trouble in the Gulf of Tonkin in the first place. There is no discussion whatsoever of more peaceful courses of action. The major exclusion of these diverse possibilities exhibits how set the government was on continuing its aggression, as the minds of authority had already decided on brutality.
While these naval attacks would have regularly been recorded as concrete historical events, they have been reported to have taken place on conflicting dates, which vary for different sources. Furthermore, normally crucial details, such as the number of people wounded or killed, or the extent of damages, are left out of most accounts of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin. For instance, while the date of the alleged attack on the Maddox should have been set in stone, two sources (timeline from Vietnam War: A History in Documents and Document 9) say it took place on August 2, and one source (Document 7) claims it took place on August 4. When corroborating the documents to compare these two dates, the difference can be determined to be around 2-3 days— just the right span for a minor, behind-the-scenes military conflict to take place. Disagreeing sources may suggest that it was not just one attack that was carried out. Rather, it might have been an exchange of aggression that would be difficult to pinpoint to a single specific date. It can also be noted that most nations aren’t habitually specific in the date of a conflict they instigated themselves, which makes it all the more interesting that both sides of the story provide an exact day on which the attack occurred. The two nations couldn’t have both simply reacted to aggression, for one of them had to serve as the assailant. It can also be figured that perhaps no specific U.S. death, injury, or damage calculation was included in evidence like Document 1 because those pieces of data would not be significant enough to rally a nation for an upcoming war. These numbers also may have been excluded because with them might come investigation into the harm the United States had inflicted on North Vietnam, the magnitude of which might be incredibly suspicious for the “victims” of an “unprovoked attack.” (Document 1). At any rate, the finer details of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin would likely be unimportant to the U.S., whose primary goal in such a situation would have been to deliver a more general message of innocence and victimization to an easily swayed, trusting population.
U.S. activities in Vietnam brought about stress and controversy among American citizens. In his televised speech, President Johnson’s aim was not to inform the public, but to rally them behind his cause (Document 5). To do this, he might look to leave out some of the more unfavorable U.S. actions, such as potentially provoking the North Vietnamese. In his speech, he states that we are in the midst of a complex war, a war “guided by North Viet-Nam” and “spurred by Communist China.” He depicts the United States as the world’s last defense, its power as “a very vital shield.” (Document 5). Going on to justify his decision for aggressive military action, he explains that “retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.” That is the ideological standpoint the President most likely approached the Gulf of Tonkin with. If this speech is sourced back to the President and his office, its primary purpose was to appease a distressed nation— truthfulness was less a priority at that time than ever. The President describes the U.S. conflict with North Vietnam as war, which brings up the conundrum that war rarely occurs unprovoked. What is most prominent when the document is closely read is the President’s reference to the U.S. as the gallant protector of international well-being, which, while possessing a distinct ring to it, holds no concrete explanation as to why we must be the world’s guardian. Justification of military response is never included. Also, while the President said the war was “guided by North Viet-Nam,” he never actually went into specific aggressive Vietnamese action against the United States. This is, perhaps, because no explicit conflict was instigated by North Vietnam until U.S. aggravation, a concept that would not have been well recepted by the general American public. Furthermore, for such pivotal events, the happenings in the Gulf of Tonkin were never mentioned in the speech. Why would Johnson exclude an extremely convincing, concrete motivator, if not to shelter the events from the public eye and hide away evidence of potential provocation? This is a question that remained unanswered to the majority of the population of the United States and the rest of the world. This population, through calculated manipulation, was left in the dark as to the truth and justification behind the infamous Gulf of Tonkin incident.
America’s evident self-victimization was more likely a mass deception executed by a violence-oriented government.
Regarding the allegedly random attacks on the U.S.S. Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy, the United States government reported
that these actions were in no way provoked by any aggression on their part. However, the evidence alternatively suggests that unwarranted American activity may have prompted the North Vietnamese to retaliate. In a conversation between President Johnson and former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson, the President himself could be recorded as saying, “There have been some covert operations in that area that we have been carrying on— blowing up some bridges and things of that kind, roads and so forth. So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it.” (Document 3). It can be discerned that to combat widespread dissent with activities in Vietnam, what the government really intended and what it claimed to intend may have been two completely different things. To introduce “The Real Story,” it is stated that “Publicly, administration officials were unwilling to admit that the U.S. Navy destroyers may have been engaged in provocative military action against North Vietnam. But privately they knew better.” This goes to show that while trying to look favorable in the public eye, the government may have distributed misinformation about the recent occurrences in the Gulf of Tonkin. Through further analyzing the text, a particular exchange that stands out is that of Johnson and Anderson discussing their course of action in the Gulf. As stated the President, “What happened was we’ve been playing around up there and they came out, gave us a warning, and we knocked hell out of ‘em.” Anderson then replied, “That’s the best thing in the world you could have done— just knock hell out of ‘em.” (Document 3). This violent language indicates violent intentions, which may have led to the trouble in the Gulf of Tonkin in the first place. There is no discussion whatsoever of more peaceful courses of action. The major exclusion of these diverse possibilities exhibits how set the government was on continuing its aggression, as the minds of authority had already decided on brutality.
While these naval attacks would have regularly been recorded as concrete historical events, they have been reported to have taken place on conflicting dates, which vary for different sources. Furthermore, normally crucial details, such as the number of people wounded or killed, or the extent of damages, are left out of most accounts of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin. For instance, while the date of the alleged attack on the Maddox should have been set in stone, two sources (timeline from Vietnam War: A History in Documents and Document 9) say it took place on August 2, and one source (Document 7) claims it took place on August 4. When corroborating the documents to compare these two dates, the difference can be determined to be around 2-3 days— just the right span for a minor, behind-the-scenes military conflict to take place. Disagreeing sources may suggest that it was not just one attack that was carried out. Rather, it might have been an exchange of aggression that would be difficult to pinpoint to a single specific date. It can also be noted that most nations aren’t habitually specific in the date of a conflict they instigated themselves, which makes it all the more interesting that both sides of the story provide an exact day on which the attack occurred. The two nations couldn’t have both simply reacted to aggression, for one of them had to serve as the assailant. It can also be figured that perhaps no specific U.S. death, injury, or damage calculation was included in evidence like Document 1 because those pieces of data would not be significant enough to rally a nation for an upcoming war. These numbers also may have been excluded because with them might come investigation into the harm the United States had inflicted on North Vietnam, the magnitude of which might be incredibly suspicious for the “victims” of an “unprovoked attack.” (Document 1). At any rate, the finer details of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin would likely be unimportant to the U.S., whose primary goal in such a situation would have been to deliver a more general message of innocence and victimization to an easily swayed, trusting population.
U.S. activities in Vietnam brought about stress and controversy among American citizens. In his televised speech, President Johnson’s aim was not to inform the public, but to rally them behind his cause (Document 5). To do this, he might look to leave out some of the more unfavorable U.S. actions, such as potentially provoking the North Vietnamese. In his speech, he states that we are in the midst of a complex war, a war “guided by North Viet-Nam” and “spurred by Communist China.” He depicts the United States as the world’s last defense, its power as “a very vital shield.” (Document 5). Going on to justify his decision for aggressive military action, he explains that “retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.” That is the ideological standpoint the President most likely approached the Gulf of Tonkin with. If this speech is sourced back to the President and his office, its primary purpose was to appease a distressed nation— truthfulness was less a priority at that time than ever. The President describes the U.S. conflict with North Vietnam as war, which brings up the conundrum that war rarely occurs unprovoked. What is most prominent when the document is closely read is the President’s reference to the U.S. as the gallant protector of international well-being, which, while possessing a distinct ring to it, holds no concrete explanation as to why we must be the world’s guardian. Justification of military response is never included. Also, while the President said the war was “guided by North Viet-Nam,” he never actually went into specific aggressive Vietnamese action against the United States. This is, perhaps, because no explicit conflict was instigated by North Vietnam until U.S. aggravation, a concept that would not have been well recepted by the general American public. Furthermore, for such pivotal events, the happenings in the Gulf of Tonkin were never mentioned in the speech. Why would Johnson exclude an extremely convincing, concrete motivator, if not to shelter the events from the public eye and hide away evidence of potential provocation? This is a question that remained unanswered to the majority of the population of the United States and the rest of the world. This population, through calculated manipulation, was left in the dark as to the truth and justification behind the infamous Gulf of Tonkin incident.